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Horn: A Military Engima

A Military Enigma
The Canadian Special Air Service
Company, 1948-1949
Bernd Horn

T

he Canadian Special Air Service (SAS)
Company is truly a military enigma. Very few
people are aware of its short-lived existence.
Those who are normally have a misunderstanding of its origins and role, a misconception
largely reinforced by the sparse and largely
inaccurate material that has been written on the
subject. For example, most believe that it was
raised specifically to provide a commando
capability within the Canadian Army immediately
after the Second World War.
The story of the Canadian SAS Company is
actually surreptitious. The army originally
packaged the sub-unit as a very benevolent
organization, centred on aid to the civil authority
and assistance to the general public. Once
established, however, a fundamental and
contentious shift in its orientation became evident
-one that was never fully resolved prior to the
sub-unit's demise. With time, myths, often
enough repeated, took on the essence of fact.
The cessation of hostilities in the spring of
1945, not only brought the Second World War to
an end, but also closed the chapter on Canada's
premiere airborne unit, the First Canadian
Parachute Battalion. The paratroop unit was
formally disbanded on 30 September 1945, and
no immediate plans were made for its
replacement. The long costly global struggle had
taken its toll and a debt-ridden and war-weary
government was intent on a post -war army which
was anything but extravagant.
Notwithstanding the military's achievements
during the war, the Canadian government had
but two requirements for its peacetime army.
First, it was to consist of a representative group

of all arms of the service. Second, it was to
provide a small but highly trained and skilled
professional force which, in time of conflict, could
expand and train citizen soldiers who would fight
that war. 1 Within this framework paratroopers
had limited relevance. Not surprisingly, few
showed concern for the potential loss of Canada's
hard-earned airborne experience.
In the austere postwar climate of"minimum
peace-time obligations," the fate of Canada's
airborne soldiers was dubious at best. 2 The
training of new paratroopers at the Canadian
Parachute Training Centre in Shilo had ceased
as early as May 1945. 3 The school itself faced a
tenuous future. Its survival hung in the air
pending the final decision on the structure of the
post-war army.
Nevertheless, the parachute school, largely
on its own initiative, worked to keep abreast of
airborne developments and attempted to
perpetuate the links with American and British
airborne units which had been forged in the
Second World War. The efforts of individuals such
as Major George Flint, the Commanding Officer
of the airborne training centre, became
instrumental in maintaining a degree of airborne
expertise. He selectively culled the ranks of the
disbanding 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion and
chose the best from the pool of personnel who
had decided to remain in the Active Force to act
as instructors and staff for his training
establishment. "No one knew what we were
supposed to do," recalled Lieutenant Bob Firlotte,
one of the individuals hand-picked to serve at
the training centre, "and we received absolutely
no direction from Army Headquarters. "4
However, Flint and his staff filled the vacuum.
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Paratroopers exiting a C-47 Dakota.

into cold weather conditions. Canada seemed to
be the ideal intermediary for both needs. 7
It was not lost on the Canadians that
cooperation with its closest defence partners
would allow Canada to benefit from an exchange
of information on the latest defence developments
and doctrine. For the airborne advocates, a test
facility was not a parachute unit, but it would
allow the Canadian military to stay in the game.
During the interim period, NDHQ considered
various configurations for an airborne research
and development centre and/or parachute
training school. In the end, for the sake of
efficiency of manpower and resources, National
Defence Headquarters decided that both entities
should be incorporated into a single Canadian
Joint Army I Air Training Centre. As a result, on
15 August 1947, military headquarters
authorized the formation of the Joint Air School
(JAS), in Rivers, Manitoba. 8

Lieutenant Ken Arril, the Officer Commanding
the Technical Tactical Investigation Section
(TTIS) in 1945-1946, stated that he was
primarily focussed on making contacts and
keeping up-to-date with the latest airborne
developments. 5 These prescient efforts were soon
to be rewarded.
The perpetuation of links with Canada's
closest allies, as well as the importance of staying
abreast of the latest tactical developments in
modern warfare, specifically air-transportability,
provided the breath of life that Flint and other
airborne advocates were looking for. A 194 7
National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) study
revealed that British peacetime policy was based
on training and equipping all infantry formations
to be air-transportable. 6 Furthermore, closer
discussions ascertained that both the Americans
and the British would welcome an Airborne
Establishment in Canada that would be capable
of"filling in the gaps in their knowledge." These
"gaps" included the problem of standardization
of equipment between Britain and the United
States, and the need for experimental research

For the airborne advocates the JAS became
the "foot in the door." The military command now
entrusted the Joint Air School with the retention
of skills required for airborne operations, for
both the Army and the RCAF. Its specific mandate
included:
a.

Research in Airportability of Army
personnel and equipment.

b.

User Trials of equipment, especially under
cold weather conditions.

c.

Limited Development and Assessment of
Airborne equipment.

d.

Training of Paratroop volunteers; training
in Airportability of personnel and
equipment; training in maintenance of air;
advanced training of Glider pilots in
exercises with troops; training in some of
the uses of light aircraft. 9

More important, the JAS, which was later
officially renamed the Canadian Joint Air
Training Centre (CJATC), provided the seed from
which airborne organizations could grow. 10
Once the permanent structure of the army
was established in 194 7, the impetus for
expanding the airborne capability began to stir
within the Joint Air School. The growth
manifested itself in a proposal supported by
Army Headquarters in Ottawa, in May 194 7, for
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a Canadian Special Air Service (SAS) Company. 11
This organization was to be an integral sub-unit
of the Army component of the JAS. Its purpose
was defined in June of the same year as filling a
need to perform Army, inter-service, and public
duties such as Army I Air tactical research and
development; demonstrations to assist with
Army I Air training; Airborne Firefighting; Search
and Rescue; and Aid to the Civil PowerY~ Its
development, however, proved to be very
surreptitious.
The initial proposal prescribed a clearly
defined role. The Army, which sponsored the
establishment of the fledgling organization,
portrayed the SAS Company's inherent mobility
as a definite asset to the public at large for
domestic operations. A military appreciation
eloquently expressed the benefit of the unique
sub-unit in terms of its potential benefit to the
country. It explained that the specially trained
company would provide an "efficient life and
property saving organization capable of moving
from its base to any point in Canada in ten to
fifteen hours. "13 The official DND Report for 1948,
reinforced this sentiment. Its rationale for the
establishment of the SAS Company was the
cooperation "with the R.C.A.F. in the air searchrescue duties required by the International Civil
Aviation Organization agreement." 14
The proposed training plan further
supported this benevolent image. The training
cycle consisted of four phases: 1.) Tactical
Research and Development (parachute related
work and fieldcraft skills); 2.) Airborne
Firefighting; 3.) Air Search and Rescue; and 4.)
Mobile Aid to the Civil Power (crowd control, first
aid, military law). 15 Conspicuously absent was
any evidence of commando or specialist training
which the organization's name implied. After all,
the Canadian SAS Company was actually titled
after the British wartime Special Air Service that
earned a reputation for daring commando·· type
raids behind enemy lines. 16 Yet the name of the
Canadian sub-unit was a total contradiction to
its stated role. It was also not in consonance with
the four phases of allocated training. Something
was clearly amiss. Either the sub-unit was named
incorrectly or its operational and training focus
was misrepresented. Initially no one seemed to
notice.

In September 194 7, the Director of Weapons
and Development forwarded the request for the
new organization to the Deputy Chief of the
General Staff. This submission affixed two
additional roles to the SAS Company. One was
"public service in the event of a national
catastrophe." The other was the "provision of a
nucleus for expansion into parachute battalions."
Despite the additional duties, the memorandum
reinforced that "This [SAS] Company is required
immediately for training as it is these troops who
will provide the manpower for the large
programme of test and development that must
be carried out by the Tactical Research and
Development Wing." It further outlined the
requirement for the SAS Company to "provide
the demonstration team for all demonstrations
within and outside the School." 17 Once again there
was no emphasis on a special forces or warfighting orientation.
However, "mission creep" began to appear in
late October 194 7. Embedded in an assessment
of potential benefits that the proposed Canadian
SAS Company could provide to the army was an
entirely new idea hitherto unmentioned. "The
formation of a SAS Company," the report
explained, "is in line with British Army Air Group
post war plans; whereby the SAS is being retained
as a small group integrated within the Airborne
Division. This provision is to keep the techniques
employed by SAS persons during the war alive
in the peacetime army." 18 Although appearing last
in the order of priority in the list, in practise it
would soon move to the forefront.
Once the Chief of the General Staff (CGS)
authorized the sub-unit, with an effective date of

Four 'jumpers" at Rivers, Manitoba, 1948.
(l. tor.: L!Cpl Dawm, Pte. Roberts,
L!Cpl. Reeves, and Pte. Tredwell.
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SAS Company paratroopers loading a
C -119 Boxcar aircraft (left) and the
subsquent para-drop (below l~ft).
b. Provide a formed body of troops to
participate in tactical exercises and
demonstrations for courses at the
CJATC and service units throughout
the country.
c. Preserve and advance the techniques
of SAS [commando] operations
developed during WW II 1939-1945.
d. Provide when required parachutists
to back-up the RCAF organizations as
detailed in the Interim Plan for air
Search and Rescue.
e. Aid Civil Authorities in fighting
forest fires and assist in national
catastrophes when authorized by
Defence Headquarters.'"

Photos courtesy of B.A.J. Franklin

9 January 1948, a dramatic change in focus
became evident. Not only did its function as a
base for expansion for the development of
airborne units take precedence, but also the
previously subtle reference to a war fighting,
special forces role, leapt to the foreground. The
new terms of reference for the employment of
the SAS Company outlined the following duties
in a revised priority:
a. Provide a tactical parachute company for
airborne training. This company is to form the
nucleus for expansion for the training of the three
infantry battalions as parachute battalions.

The shift was anything but subtle.
The original emphasis on aid to the
civil authority and public service
functions, duties which could be
justified to a war-weary government
and a budget conscious military
leadership, were now re-prioritized
if not totally marginalized. In all
fairness, the changing terms of
reference for the Special Air Service
Company was in part pragmatic. It
represented the army's initial
reaction to the Government's
announcement in 1946, that
contemplated airborne training for
the Active Force Brigade Group and
that an establishment to this end was
being created. 20 But, the dramatic
mission shift also represented a case
of "gamesmanship." It allowed the
strong airborne lobby within the
Canadian Joint Air Training Centre, and others
in the army with wartime airborne experience,
an opportunity to perpetuate a capability that they
believed was at risk. 21
This was clearly evident in the 1948-1949
Historical Report for the Joint Air School. The
Army Component of the JAS explained the
establishment of the SAS Company in the
following terms: "The Special Air Service
originated during World War II when after
numerous operations military authorities were
convinced that a few men working behind enemy
lines, could, with sufficient bluff and daring

24
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wreak havoc with supplies and communications.
Results obtained during the war assured its
continued existence." 22 The report was not only
incorrect in its assessment of the value placed
on special operations type units during the war,
but more importantly, it clearly reflected a war
fighting rather than public service orientation. 23
This was in complete contrast to the rationale
used to justify the establishment of the sub-unit.
It was, however, consistent with the beliefs of
those who were selected to serve in the
organization.
If there was any confusion in regard to the
purpose and role of the SAS Company, it certainly
did not exist in the mind of the Officer
Commanding (OC) the sub-unit. The new
organization was established at a company
strength of 125 and comprised one platoon from
each of the three regular infantry regiments, the
Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), the Royal 22nd
Regiment (R22eR) and Princess Patricia's
Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). Captain Guy
D'Artois, a wartime member of the First Special
Service Force, and later the Special Operations
Executive (SOE), was posted to the sub-unit as
its Second in Command. Contrary to popular
mythology, Captain D'Artois was not selected as
OC of the SAS Company based on his wartime
experience or exploits. In fact, he was not
originally considered at all. Within some elements
of the army "the future of the SAS Coy" was
apparently "in doubt." As a result, little effort was
made to find a qualified 'Major' to fill the billet
as OCY Therefore, Captain D'Artois, by default,
became the Acting Officer Commanding. By late
October 1948, the sub-unit's existence was
considered secure and efforts were then made
to find a suitable candidate. In what could be
considered testimony to military bureaucracy, the
demise of the unit occurred prior to the
appointment of a new OC. As a result, D'Artois
was the first and only Officer Commanding, albeit
in an acting capacity. His performance, however,
was outstanding by all accounts.

D'Artois trained his sub-unit of carefully
selected paratroopers as a specialized
commando force. 25 His intractable approach and
trademark persistence quickly made him the
"absolute despair of the Senior Officers at Rivers
[CJATC]." 26 Veterans of the SAS Company
explained that "Captain D'Artois didn't
understand 'no.' He carried on with his training

regardless of what others said. "27 Another veteran
recalled that "Guy answered to no one, he was
his own man, who ran his own show. "28
Organizationally the sub-unit may have been
solid, but its future was not. Its ultimate function
and role were obscured by varied interpretations.
As early as May 1948, less than six months since
its establishment, the Army's Director of Air was
compelled to defend the existence of the SAS
Company against calls for a review of its mandate.
Interestingly, he rationalized the necessity of not
only maintaining the sub-unit, but also of
ensuring its continuance at full strength because
of the expertise the members represented in such
fields as "airbome, airtransported, air supply and
SAS operations." He argued this would be
difficult to recapture "if they were required to
reconstitute the SAS Company or as a nucleus
of an SAS Regiment. "29 Clearly, his image of the
organization's raison d'etre was at variance with
the original purpose given for its establishment.
But the central issue remained. Was the SAS
Company in fact the nucleus of a larger airborne
force? Was it designed to be an elite commando
unit? Or was it just simply a demonstration team
for the Canadian Joint Air Training Centre?
Evidence exists to support each perspective. :Jo
This confusion was merely a symptom of a larger
problem, namely there was no clear
understanding or agreement of the role the
paratroopers were to fulfill. It was characteristic
of the blight that has permeated the entire
Canadian airborne experience over the years.
The major problem was the lack of a coherent
role for Canadian airbome forces, which not only
justified their existence, but also warranted the
full support of the entire military and political
leadership. The continued survival of the CJATC
and its limited airbome capability was largely
due to an American and British preoccupation
with airborne and air-transportable forces in the
postwar period. This was based on a concept of
security established on smaller standing forces
with greater tactical and strategic mobility. The
cash-strapped Canadian political and military
leadership also came to realize that such a force
could provide a great political expedient. It
provided the shell under which the government
could claim it was meeting its obligations, yet
minimize its actual defence expenditures. In
essence, possession of paratroopers could
25
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SAS Company paratroopers providing a "wind machine" training demonstration
at the Joint Air School, Rivers, Manitoba, January-February 1948.

represent the nation's ready sword. They afforded
a conceivably viable means to combat any hostile
intrusion to the North. Better still, they would
be incredibly cheap, if they were maintained
simply as a 'paper tiger.'
In addition, looming in the background was
the 1946 Canada/U.S. Basic Security Plan which
imposed on Canada the requirement to provide
one airborne/ air-transportable brigade, and its
necessary airlift, as its share of the overall
continental defence agreement.:ll This obligation
necessitated the retention of the Canadian Joint
Air Training Centre. It also prompted the spark
which fuelled the need for an organization which
would act as a training tool and potential nucleus
for an expanded airborne force. 32 As noted earlier,
in 1946, the government had briefed Parliament
that airborne training was planned for the Active
Force Brigade Group. Yet, no action was taken
for more than two years. The SAS Company
represented the total sum of Canada's operational
airborne capability. Incredibly, for most of that
period contentious debate continued over its
actual function and role.
By the summer of 1948, some form of action
was required. The creation of the airborne/airtransportable Brigade Group had not advanced
beyond the conceptual agreement of the senior

military commanders. The plan finally moved
forward with the Joint Air Committee decision
that:
The CGS, Canadian Army desires to commence
the training of one battalion of infantry for
airborne I air- transported operations. This one
battalion is the Canadian component to meet
the immediate requirements of the BSP. The air
training of this battalion (less collective battalion
exercise) is required to be completed by 1 April
1949.""

The spark was prompted not by
governmental or military diligence, but again by
the spectre of the Americans. The Basic Security
Plan of two years previous had obligated the
Canadian army to be prepared for Arctic airborne
and/or air-transportable operations, to counter
or reduce enemy lodgements in Canada. This
program compelled the Canadian government to
have a battalion combat team prepared by 1 May
1949 to respond immediately to any actual
lodgement, with a second battalion available
within two months, and an entire brigade group
within four months. 34 Time was running out and
with the possible exception of the Special Air
Service Company, nothing had been done.
Two years had elapsed since the
government's public declaration that the Active
Force Brigade Group would become an airborne/
air-transportable organization. Yet it was not until
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July 1948, that NDHQ granted authority to
commence airborne/ air-transportable training. It
was another month before these words were
finally translated into action. At this time the
VCGS, Major-General Churchill Mann, visited the
PPCLI battalion in Calgary and asked them to
convert to airborne status. Training, he stated,
was to commence in three months time and was
to be completed by May 1949. The effect was
profound. The unit in its entirety volunteered for
airborne service. 35 The first concrete step to
establish the airborne I air-transportable brigade,
as required by the 1946 Basic Security Plan, had
finally been taken.
The effect on the existing small SAS Company
was immediate and corrosive. Initially the subunit lost only its PPCLI platoon which formed
the training cadre for the conversion of the
'Patricia' battalion. Army Headquarters directed
that the SAS Company's 'Patricia' platoon, once
it had completed its instructional tasks, be
permanently stripped from the sub-unit so that
the platoon could return to Calgary with its parent
regiment to provide a core of experienced

paratroop instructors. 36 Although a replacement
platoon from the service support trades was
raised, the fate of the SAS Company was sealed. 37
Its personnel were increasingly drafted as
instructional staff for the Canadian Joint Air
Training Centre training scheme to convert the
remaining two infantry battalions into airborne/
air-transportable units.
During this period the ongoing debate over
the SAS Company's actual role and existence
resurfaced. In September 1948, in light of the
creation of the Mobile Striking Force (MSF), the
Director of Military Training in NDHQ demanded
a reassessment of the Canadian SAS Company.
"I cannot," he argued, "agree with what appears
to be the present concepts of the SAS Company."
He identified the contradiction between the
original intent and the actual practise. He added,
"I feel first and foremost that its name should be
changed .. .it is true that in war they [special forces
type units] do produce a result out of all
proportion to their aims, if properly employed;
but they do not win battles; they are a luxury
and it is very much doubted ifthey, in their true

High tower training,
Shilo, Manitoba.
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sense, can be recruited from our peace time
armed forces." 38 A month later the CGS
announced his intention to disband the Canadian
SAS Company upon the completion of airborne
conversion training by the R22eR, who
represented the last unit of the three Active Force
infantry regiments to undertake it. 39 As a result
of this direction the posting of personnel to the
SAS Company dried up. "It should be noted that
in view of the present policy," complained the
Army, "the AG [Adjutant General] Branch regards
the SAS Coy as a wasting commitment and is
loath to post personnel to fill existing vacancies
in it. "40
In a complete reversal, the VCGS affirmed in
June 1949 that the SAS Company "will remain
in being indefinitely with its present organization
and establishment" and that it would be brought
to strength. 41 The Army's lobbying in support of
the sub-unit seemingly paid off. Despite the
reprieve, however, the change in training focus
and composition of the SAS Company, as a result
of its instructional duties in support of CJATC's
airborne conversion training for the Active Force
infantry regiments, eroded the sub-unit's makeup. The result was the demise of the organization.
Problems with morale surfaced, particularly
in the R22eR Platoon. An army investigation
noted that the "deterioration only set in when the
terms of reference for the SAS Company were
radically altered." An analysis of SAS Company
training revealed that the personnel were
employed almost exclusively in administrative
tasks, either in instruction or on parachute
packing and maintenance. The R22eR Platoon
was described as "carrying out a rather
haphazard form of training, part time and is
almost continually on call to load and lash
equipment. "42 And finally, the majority of the
Composite Platoon, which replaced the Patricia
Platoon, was employed in parachute packing and
maintenance. 43
The discontent manifested itself in the
refusal offive members to jump in a two month
period and the request by individuals,
particularly R22eR members, to return to their
parent units. 44 Rumours and stories of
dissension quickly spread. The situation was
deemed so serious that the CGS personally
visited Rivers in July 1949. Resolution to the
problem followed swiftly. "The CGS having visited

CJATC Rivers," wrote the Vice Chief of the
General Staff, "has directed that the platoon of
the R22eR will be withdrawn as soon as
administrative arrangements can be
completed. "45 Although direction was also given
to the Commanding Officer of the R22eR to post
two officers and 15 "Other Ranks," by 1
September 1949, as instructors to Rivers to
replace the withdrawn personnel, the die had
been cast.
The SAS Company, whose role was never
clear, became subsumed by the larger
requirement to convert the infantry regiments
into airborne units. By the time the program was
terminated, the Special Air Service Company had
virtually ceased to exist. Its personnel rejoined
their parent regiments as their respective training
was completed. Sergeant B.C. Robinson, a
veteran of both l Canadian Parachute Battalion
and the SAS Company, recalled that the news of
the sub-unit's termination was discovered when
Captain D'Artois informed the Company that they
had been disbanded because the Mobile Striking
Force was starting up. 46 The disbandment was
so low key that no official date has been
discovered.
In the end, it seems as if the demise of the
Canadian SAS Company was shrouded in as
much contradiction as its establishment.
Nonetheless, the SAS Company served as a
"bridge" linking the Canadian Parachute Battalion
and the three infantry battalions which
conceptually formed an airborne brigadeY It
perpetuated the airborne spirit and kept the
requisite parachute skills alive. However, its
existence suffered from a lack of clarity and
commitment. Its 'successor' would be similarly
handicapped.
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